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Abstract
As computing systems become increasingly advanced and as users increasingly engage them-
selves in technology, security has never been a greater concern. In malware detection, static analysis,
the method of analyzing potentially malicious files, has been the prominent approach. This approach,
however, quickly falls short as malicious programs become more advanced and adopt the capabilities
of obfuscating its binaries to execute the same malicious functions, making static analysis extremely
difficult for newer variants. The approach assessed in this paper is a novel dynamic malware analysis
method, which may generalize better than static analysis to newer variants. Inspired by recent suc-
cesses in Natural Language Processing (NLP), widely used document classification techniques were
assessed in detecting malware by doing such analysis on system calls, which contain useful informa-
tion about the operation of a program as requests that the program makes of the kernel. Features
considered are extracted from system call traces of benign and malicious programs, and the task to
classify these traces is treated as a binary document classification task of system call traces. The
system call traces were processed to remove the parameters to only leave the system call function
names. The features were grouped into various n-grams and weighted with Term Frequency-Inverse
Document Frequency. This paper shows that Linear Support Vector Machines (SVM) optimized
by Stochastic Gradient Descent and the traditional Coordinate Descent on the Wolfe Dual form of
the SVM are effective in this approach, achieving a highest of 96% accuracy with 95% recall score.
Additional contributions include the identification of significant system call sequences that could be
avenues for further research.
I. INTRODUCTION
Static malware analysis has been the prominent ap-
proach in malware detection. Static analysis pertains to
analyzing binaries of programs without executing them.
Although many valid approaches have been proposed, re-
search suggests that the binary code obfuscation tech-
niques that are available today are incredibly difficult
to overcome [12]. For the same reason, although static
analysis can often accurately detect known malware, it
struggles against new variants and zero-day threats [3].
Regarding this, an approach that may resolve this issue
is dynamically analyzing a given program to detect if it
is malicious, thereby analyzing the behavior of programs
instead. The idea is that even if a malicious file changes,
its behavior should remain the same. Dynamic analysis
aims to find patterns in program execution, training a
program to do which will allow future detection of mali-
cious behavior, regardless of its code structure or whether
or not it has been found before.
Some approaches to dynamic analysis of malware in-
clude looking for files that have been added or modified,
newly installed services, newly running processes, reg-
istry modifications, and more [5]. One such method is
analyses of system calls. System calls are routines user
programs call to use services of the operating system [7].
Any program running in an operating system has a defini-
tive set of system calls. By analyzing sequences of system
calls of programs running in normal operating conditions,
NtQueryPerformanceCounter( Counter=0xbcf6c8
[1.45779e+009], Freq=null ) => 0
NtProtectVirtualMemory( ProcessHandle=-1,
BaseAddress=0xbcf6f4 ?
NtProtectVirtualMemory( ProcessHandle=-1,
BaseAddress=0xbcf6f4 [0x7702e000]?
NtQuerySystemInformation(
SystemInformationClass=0
[SystemBasicInformation]
NtQueryVirtualMemory( ProcessHandle=-1,
BaseAddress=0x76f20000,
FIG. 1: Example System Call Trace (truncated to five
calls)
one may gain insight in the abnormality of processes exe-
cuted by a given malicious program by analyzing to what
extent it diverges from usual behavior. FIG. 1 shows an
example Windows Native API system call trace.
The task to classify traces of system calls as belonging
to either a malicious or a benign program is treated in
parallel to a binary document classification task. Docu-
ment classification is a form of machine learning, a sub-
set of Natural Language Processing (NLP), aiming to
assign a category or a class to a document by analyzing
its content [6]. With recent improvements and successes
in document classification, it was deemed appropriate to
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2utilize its methods to evaluate its effectiveness in this re-
gard [11]. The purpose of this research is to evaluate
the effectiveness of a machine learning approach in mal-
ware detection, using document classification techniques
to conduct dynamic analysis of malicious programs using
system call traces. A trace of system calls of a given pro-
gram will be equivalent of a document in a document clas-
sification task, and by training classifiers on the dataset,
we aim to classify previously undetected malicious pro-
grams by making predictions based on their system calls.
II. RELATED WORK
The ease in which static data about malware can be
obfuscated and the extent to which that increases the
limits of static analysis approaches to malware detection
have been extensively evaluated [12]. Intrusion detection
using approaches ranging from variants of SVMs and neu-
ral networks using data pertaining to network traffic have
been attempted with significant success [13][17][2][8].
Specifically in analysis of system calls, there has been
implementations on Android phones [10][4]. In applica-
tion to Windows operating systems, there has been an
approach using n-grams of Windows API calls and SVM,
a further discussion on n-grams of system calls and its
variants dubbed Sequencegrams, and a paper assessing
the use of one, two, three, and four grams of system calls
weighted by TF-IDF in malware detection [18][7][3].
This study aims to build upon the related work by
attempting and comparing different approaches in using
document classification techniques on system call analy-
sis in detecting malware. It seeks to prove that certain
choices are noticeably useful in this approach. It also
proposes a system that integrates this approach of us-
ing system calls for malware detection into a deployable
form.
III. PROCEDURE
Note: The feature extraction process and the detec-
tion algorithms were implemented using the Scikit-learn
libary [16].
A. Dataset Preparation
Various malware corpora were collected from online
sources such as VirusShare and The Zoo [20][14]. Virus-
Total, a website that displays results of testing the pro-
gram on various antivirus software, was used to validate
whether or not a given program was malicious or benign
[21]. A program was deemed to be malicious if more
than 80% of the antivirus softwares shown in VirusTotal
deemed it to be malicious, and a program was deemed to
be benign if all agreed that it was harmless.
Unload of DLL at 04ED0000
Unload of DLL at 04FC0000
NtQueryPerformanceCounter( Counter=0x4e9f9c8
[3.01683e+009], Freq=null ) => 0
NtProtectVirtualMemory( ProcessHandle=-1,
BaseAddress=0x4e9f9f4 [0x77eae000],
Size=0x4e9f9f8
y
NtQueryPerformanceCounter
NtProtectVirtualMemory
FIG. 2: Processing Trace
NtTrace, a native API tracer for Windows, was used to
collect system call traces. [15]. This program is designed
to run in the command prompt, specifying the path to
the program as well as options on how it should be traced
(filters, logging only errors, etc). As running malware on
personal computers will not be safe for various reasons,
a virtual machine was created to be used as a host. Vir-
tualBox was used for this purpose [19]. Malware samples
were executed on a Windows operating system hosted
in VirtualBox. Batch scripts were used to automate the
process of collecting the system calls. A batch script is a
file that executes a series of commands [9]. Batch scripts
can run these commands in loops, automating the pro-
cess of tracing the system calls executed by hundreds of
programs.
B. Text Preprocessing
Because the features considered are sequences of sys-
tem call functions, for the purpose of this research, the
parameters were not considered as a feature. A script
was used to process the system call logs generated by
NtTrace to remove the parameters, only leaving the func-
tion names. Furthermore, sections of the logs that were
not related to system call function names, such as logs in-
forming unloading of DLLs, were removed as well. FIG.
2 demonstrates this pre-processing process.
C. Feature Extraction
We define some terms and variables that will be
referred to as following:
3D = {d1, d2, . . . , dn}
V = {w1, w2, . . . , wn}
fd(w) = frequency of the word w∈V in d∈D
~td = (fd(w1), fd(w2), . . . , fd(w|v||))
D is the document corpus and d represents a par-
ticular document.
V is the vocabulary and w represent each word
that appears in the corpora
1. Bags of Words Model
Bags of words is the way in which features are
extracted from text to be used for the machine learning
algorithms. The idea behind “bag” is that order is
not accounted for; this model only takes into account
whether certain words occur in a document, not where
they occur in a document [1]. In this research, this
model is applied in the sense that the “words” are
system calls and the “documents” are logs of system
calls. In this model, set V is built as the vocabulary set
of all unique system calls (represented by wn, where n
is the index of the system call in the vocabulary). Each
document is represented by how many times every wn
occurs in the document, as represented by ~td, where
fd(wn) represents the frequency of the system call of
index n in the log d.
2. N-Grams Model
This approach to use single system calls as features
is a unigram approach, as the features consist of just
one “gram”. This falls short in many text classification
tasks as the bags-of-words model does not take into ac-
count sequences of text. The n-gram model accommo-
dates for this issue, where the features are sequences of
system calls instead of a single system call, therefore an-
alyzing frequencies of sequences of system calls instead
of frequencies of individual system calls. In an n-grams
model, the features are sequences of n number of system
calls. FIG. 3 demonstrates the conversion of unigrams to
bigrams.
In this research, the implemented n-grams were
eight-grams, nine-grams, and ten-grams. This was
derived through grid search algorithms specified later
that showed that this combination provided the best ac-
curacy. This was expected, considering that operations
of any program would typically require reasonably long
sequences of system calls.
3. Term Frequency - Inverse Document Fre-
quency (TF-IDF) Weighting
‘NtClose’
‘NtOpenKeyEx’
‘NtCreateFile’
‘NtCreateSection’
‘NtMapViewOfSection’
‘NtClose’
‘NtQueryVirtualMemory’
y
‘NtClose NtOpenKeyEx’,
‘NtOpenKeyEx NtCreateFile’,
‘NtCreateFile NtCreateSection’,
‘NtCreateSection
NtMapViewOfSection’,
‘NtMapViewOfSection NtClose’,
‘NtClose NtQueryVirtualMemory’,
FIG. 3: Unigrams to Bigrams Conversion
In any document corpus, certain words are more com-
mon than others, such as “the”, “a”, “of”, and more.
An assumption was made that the same idea applies to
logs of system calls, that certain sequences pertain to all
operations of any program in an operating system and
certain sequences pertain to specific operations that may
or may not be malicious. In document classification, one
of the most popular model to derive weights to terms
that occur in a document is the TF-IDF model.
Term Frequency (TF) refers to the number of times a
certain word occurs in a document. Inverse Document
Frequency (IDF) refers to the amount of times the word
occurs throughout the corpus. The TF-IDF weight of a
term is computed as following:
tf(w, d) = fd(w): frequency of w in document d
idf(w,D) = log 1+|D|1+df(d,w)
Where df(d,w) is the number of documents the
word w appears in.
This is a logarithmically scaled value of the number of
documents in the corpus divided by the number of times
word w appears throughout the corpus.
tfidf(w, d,D) = tf(w, d)× idf(w,D)
The tfidf value increases proporationally by the
frequency of w in a document, decreases proportion-
ally by the log of the frequency of w in the corpus.
The assumption is that a word that is more prevalent
4throughout the corpus is more likely to be less significant.
The resulting vectors comprised of raw tfidf values
that represent each document are normalized using the
Euclidean norm:
vnorm =
v√
v21+v
2
2+...+v
2
n
For instance:
tfidfraw = [10, 3, 1]
tfidfnormalized =
[10,3,1]√
102+32+12
= [0.953, 0.286, 0.095]
D. Detection Algorithm
1. Support Vector Machines (SVM)
The objective of a SVM classifier is to learn a deci-
sion boundary hyperplane that optimally separates the
dataset. The optimized decision boundary is then used
to compute whether or not a new data point that it is
tested on pertains to malware or not.
Given a training data, (xi, yi), where xi is the col-
lection of features (TF-IDF values of n-grams of system
calls) of a document and yi∈{−1, 1}, the objective of
SVM is to learn a classifier f(x) so that:
f(xi) =
{
> 0 yi = +1
6 0 yi = −1
Where f(xi) is defined by:
f(xi) = w
Tx+ b
The best decision boundary is determined by the
margins between the decision boundary and the support
vectors, the data points closest to the decision boundary.
The best decision boundary is defined by one that has
the largest margins from the support vectors.
2. Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) Op-
timization Using Various Regularization Terms
The Stochastic Gradient Descent algorithm optimizes
this optimal decision boundary. With the goal of learning
f(xi) = w
Tx + b, the best model parameters w∈Rm is
computed by minimizing the regularized training error,
which is given by:
E(w, b) = 1n
n∑
i=1
L(f(xi), yi) + αR(w)
Where L is the loss (cost) function, which measures the
error of the model, and R is a regularization term, re-
ducing the likelihood that the model is overfitting. The
hinge loss function (L) is defined by the following:
L(y, yˆ) = max(0, 1− y × yˆ)
where y is the prediction of the classifier and yˆ∈{−1, 1}
is the intended output.
The regularization terms R(w) implemented were L1,
L2, and Elastic Net penalties.
L1 Penalty: R(w) := 12
n∑
i=1
|wi|
L2 Penalty: R(w) := 12
n∑
i=1
w2i
Elastic-Net Penalty:
R(w) := ϕ2
n∑
i=1
w2i + (1− ϕ)
n∑
i=1
|w|
A convex combination of L1 and L2 Penalty.
Given this error function, the w parameter is updated
iteratively by the following operation:
w←w − η(α∂R(w)∂w + ∂L(w
T x+b,yi)
∂w )
Where η is the learning rate that controls the step size:
η(t) = 1α(t0+t)
Where t is the time step.
3.Coordinate Descent Method Using LibLin-
ear’s Linear Support Vector Machine
Another SVM was optimized using a different frame-
work, which was a Linear SVM implemented using
LibLinear, developed by the machine learning group
in the National Taiwan University. LibLinear uses
the Coordinate Descent method to optimize the linear
support vector machines.
The width of the margin of a SVM can be represented
by: 2||~w|| , and the objective is: yi(~xi ~w + b) > 1. This
poses a constrained optimization problem:
min 12 ||~w||2 where yi ~xi ~w + b > 1
The Lagrange form of which is:
L(~w, b, α) = 12 ||~w||2−
∑
αi[yi(~w~xi + b)− 1]
and because:
∂L
∂ ~w = ~w −
∑
αiyixi = 0
∂L
∂b = −
∑
αiyi = 0
So:
~w =
∑
αiyixi∑
αiyi = 0
The Lagrangian can be simplified to (due to the prop-
erties of the partial derivatives) the Wolfe dual form:
L(~w, b, α) =
∑
αi − 12
∑
i
∑
j αiαjyiyjx
T
i xj
Minimizing L(~w, b, α) is to:
5minα f(α) =
1
2α
TQα− eTα
Where Q is a matrix where Qij = yiyjx
T
i xj and e is a
vector of all ones.
The Coordinate Descent algorithm finds the minimum
of a multivariate function F(x) by solving univariate op-
timization problems iteratively through all its variables
(inner iteration), and iteratively doing this several times
(outer iteration). With the following definition, k being
the outer iteration and i being the inner iteration:
ak,i = [ak+11 , ..., a
k+1
i−1 , ..., a
k
i , ..., a
k
l ]
T
solving the following univariate function:
mind f(α
k,i + dei)
Where ei = [0, ..., 0, 1, 0, ..., 0]
T and d is the scaler to it,
representing a step towards that direction. It becomes
apparent that the minimum is found when d = 0, where
there is no where to move to minimize the function f ,
which is when
∇Pi f(αk,i) = 0
Where ∇P f(α) refers to the projected gradient.
4. Hyperparameter Optimization
Machine learning models require varying constraints,
learning rate, and more that can affect the performance
of the model. These factors are called hyperparameters
and they must be tuned for a model to produce optimal
performance. The method we implemented was Grid
Search, which demonstrated by Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Grid Search
1: alphagrid = [100, 10, 1, 0.1, ..., 0.0000001]
2: tolgrid = [100, 10, 1, 0.1, ..., 0.00005]
3: fl-score = []
4: for α in alphagrid do
5: for tol in tolgrid do
6: model.train(alpha=α, tol=tol)
7: pred = model.predict()
8: flscore = evaluate(pred, y-true)
9: fl-score.append(flscore)
10: end for
11: end for
12: outputMaxValue(fl-score)
The benefits of this process is visualized by Figure 4.
Darker shades of red indicates a higher value in fl score
of the model with the corresponding combination.
FIG. 4: Grid Search Output Visualized
E. Testing Procedure
1. Splitting Training & Testing Set
In order to create a realistic scenario for testing, the
corpus of data was split into a training set which the
classifiers were trained on, and a testing set which the
classifiers have not seen before. This way the results of
the classifiers could be trusted, since any system call
logs encountered in the testing data would not have
been encountered by the classifiers, and would not be
able to directly classify.
2. Precision Score
The precision score is the number of correctly identi-
fied malicious programs over the number of true positives
plus false positives:
Ps = tptp+fp
This provides a practical score to judge the perfor-
mance of each classifier, as false positives can be as
troublesome as false negatives in certain cases, and are
more noticeable during operation by users. Considering
that a lopsided proportion of malicious traces may skew
the accuracy if it only accounts for true positives, this
precision score displays a better idea of the accuracy of
the model.
3. Recall Score
The recall score is the number of true positives divided
by the number of true positives plus false negatives:
Rs = tptp+fn
6This gives an intuitive rate of how many malicious
programs were detected.
4. F1 Score
The F1 score is a weighted average of the precision
score and recall score:
F1 = 2 Ps∗RsPs+Rs
It offers a different view of the accuracy of each classifier,
in which false positives and false negatives are both inte-
grated. This acts as a more holistic means of comparison.
IV. RESULTS
The dataset was divided by a 1:4 ratio; 80% were used
to train the classifiers and 20% were used to test the
classifiers. Also, the proportion of malicious trace in the
testing set was 63.7%, and judgement on the scores pro-
vided below need to take into account this proportion.
Table 1 shows the results of primal SVM optimized us-
ing Stochastic Gradient Descent and Table 2 shows the
results of using LibLinear to optimize the dual form of
SVM using the Coordinate Descent method.
Precision Recall F1-Score
Benign 1.00 0.82 0.92
Malware 0.94 1.00 0.97
Average/Total 0.96 0.95 0.95
TABLE 1: Results of SGD Classifier
Precision Recall F1-Score
Benign 1.00 0.79 0.88
Malware 0.91 1.00 0.95
Average/Total 0.94 0.93 0.93
TABLE 2: Results of LibLinear
It is crucial for a malware detection program to not only
detect malware but have a very low false positive rate.
The programs were optimized accordingly, preferring a
better score in its precision score for benign data than
for malware.
This TPR (True Positive Rate) vs. FPR (False
Positive Rate) tradeoff can be represented through the
ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curve, which
plots the values of TPR and FPR at different decision
thresholds, shown in FIG. 5 for the SGD Classifier. FIG.
6 is the ROC curve for the SVM implemented using
LibLinear.
FIG. 5: ROC Curve of SGDClassifier (AUC=1.00)
FIG. 6: ROC Curve of LibLinear Classifier (AUC=0.97)
Furthermore, refer to Table 2 to compare the effective-
ness of the options in the feature extraction process
such as TF-IDF weighting and the use of n-grams. The
average values were computed by calculating the mean
of the respective scores of the classifiers listed previously
on Figure 4.
Avg. Precision Avg. Recall
TFIDF & 10-Grams 0.93 0.92
TFIDF & Unigrams 0.90 0.89
Term Frequency & 10-grams 0.78 0.78
None 0.75 0.72
TABLE 3: Average Scores Comparing Options
This is a valid testimony to the effectiveness of these
options not only in document classification tasks but also
in applying document classification on system call traces.
Furthermore, it is also observed that SVM classifiers were
able to classify the traces in the testing set in the shortest
time, which is one of the reasons why SVMs are often
preferred in document classification tasks. Table 3 shows
7their training and testing time in comparison to other
classifiers.
Training Time (s) Testing Time (s)
L2 Penalty SVM SGD 0.098s 0.000s
Passive-Aggressive 0.112s 0.000s
kNN 0.003s 0.059s
Bernoulli Naive Bayes 0.024s 0.018s
TABLE 4: Training & Testing Time Comparison
Although these are small absolute differences, as the clas-
sification task scales, these differences may amplify to
produce a considerable difference.
V. CONCLUSIONS & CONTRIBUTIONS
This paper demonstrates the effectiveness of applying
document classification techniques on system call traces
for the purpose of detecting malicious programs. The ef-
fectiveness and time complexities of certain algorithms as
well as certain options popular in the realm of document
classification was compared to judge the validity of these
options.
The classifiers trained in this research were also able to
provide features (TF-IDF values of 10-grams of system
calls) that they deemed to be the most significant. These
system call sequences could be avenues for further re-
search to determine the nature of these sequences.
The sequences in Table 4 were produced by the SVM clas-
sifier optimized by SGD using L1 regularization term:
7.20687749597 ntqueryinformationthread ntqueryinfor-
mationthread ntqueryinformationthread
ntqueryinformationthread ntqueryinfor-
mationthread ntqueryinformationthread
ntqueryinformationthread ntqueryinfor-
mationthread ntqueryinformationthread
ntqueryinformationthread
6.41295595185 ntmapviewofsection ntunmapviewofsection
ntmapviewofsection ntunmapviewofsection
ntmapviewofsection ntunmapviewofsection
ntmapviewofsection ntunmapviewofsection
ntmapviewofsection ntunmapviewofsection
4.75759889433 ntsetinformationfile ntreadfile ntsetinfor-
mationfile ntreadfile ntsetinformationfile
ntreadfile ntsetinformationfile ntreadfile
ntsetinformationfile ntreadfile
4.75759889433 ntreadfile ntsetinformationfile ntreadfile
ntsetinformationfile ntreadfile ntsetinfor-
mationfile ntreadfile ntsetinformationfile
ntreadfile ntsetinformationfile
TABLE 5: SVM SGD L1 Most Informative Features
Greater values of coefficients indicate greater relevance
for the specific classifier. These features were the few
among 237588 sequences that these classifiers took into
consideration in classifying these logs of system calls.
Table 5 shows the sequences produced by the same
classifier as that of Table 4, but using L2 Penalty.
3.0649184842 ntdelayexecution ntdelayexecution ntde-
layexecution ntdelayexecution ntdelayexe-
cution ntdelayexecution ntdelayexecution
ntdelayexecution ntdelayexecution ntde-
layexecution
2.07007999086 ntgetcurrentprocessornumber ntgetcur-
rentprocessornumber ntalpcsendwaitre-
ceiveport ntgetcurrentprocessornumber
ntgetcurrentprocessornumber ntalpcsend-
waitreceiveport ntgetcurrentprocessor-
number ntgetcurrentprocessornumber
ntalpcsendwaitreceiveport ntgetcurrent-
processornumber
1.55237596748 ntdeviceiocontrolfile ntclose ntcreateevent
ntdeviceiocontrolfile ntclose ntcreateevent
ntdeviceiocontrolfile ntclose ntcreateevent
ntdeviceiocontrolfile
1.52963083335 ntclose ntcreateevent ntdeviceiocontrolfile
ntclose ntcreateevent ntdeviceiocontrolfile
ntclose ntcreateevent ntdeviceiocontrolfile
ntclose
TABLE 6: SVM SGD L2 Most Informative Features
NtMalDetect (https://github.com/codeandproduce
/NtMalDetect) is an open source project that utilizes the
classifiers trained from this research to put them into an
executable form. It utilizes boosted classifiers, combining
inputs of various classifiers to produce one output, to
detect malicious program before and after execution.
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